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FROM OPPOSITION TO ALLIANCE 
by Siegfried Suckut 
Dr. Siegfried Suckut is a research asso6iate 
working in the area of the history and 
politics of the GDR (German Democratic Repub­
lic) at the University of Mannheim in West 
Germany. He is presently studying the develop­
ment of the GDR-CDU during 1945-1961. This is 
a translation of "Von der Opposition zum 
Blindnis," Kirche im Sozialismus, Vol. 8, No. 5 
(1982), pp. 50-55. Used by permission of KiS. 
Suckut had frequent opportunity to examine the 
archives of the Free German Unions (FDGB), the 
National Front, and also the GDR-CDU. In the 
historical review which is presented here on 
the origins of the GDR-CDU, Suckut has used 
material not published previously. 
From October 13 to 15, 1982, the CDU (Christian Democratic Union) 
of the GDR (German Democratic Republic), the last of the parties allied 
with the SED (Socialist Unity Party of East Germany), held its 15th 
party conference in Dresden. The last time this party received any 
notice by the Western press was in March 1972, when in the GDR 
"Volkskammer"--a sort of House of Representatives--the "law concerning 
interruption of pregnancy" was not passed unanimously, as is normal, but 
with 14 votes against and 8 abstentions. The assumption was that these 
votes came from the CDU party, presumably from those delegates closely 
affiliated with the church. 
This attitude of the Western press is typical. Even the West German 
CDU overlooks the fact that its name was coined by the eastern 
association and was taken over by the western sister organization--with 
the exception of Bavaria--in December, 1945. 
The man who founded and named the eastern CDU was the former 
Reichs-minister Andreas Hermes, who also was chosen as head of the 
Ministry of Food in the Soviet Military Zone. After the Soviets surpris­
ingly allowed the re-establishment of political parties, Hermes was the 
leading member of a group interested in initiating a Christian 'Party of 
all confessions. On June 26, 1945, the CDU was fo:rrrted, and it ·is 
therefore formally the oldest of the five parties in the GDR and, with 
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125, 103 members, the second largest. Origipally, of course, it was 
planned for all of Germany. 
The founding circle contained former Zentrum Party members, liberal 
representatives from the former DDP (German Democratic Party) --Walther 
Schreiber, Ernst Lemmer, and Otto Nuschke. During the early history of 
the CDU it was typical to have close cooperation with local church 
representatives, who were often the driving forces behind the new party. 
Church superintendents even gave the CDU lists with addresses of 
pastors, who later received letters asking for support in forming the 
party and in the upcoming political campaign . . Only a few protests came 
from those pastors who were annoyed at such methods. 
The early history of the CDU was marked by a close cooperation and 
personal involvement between church and Party. Even today on the 
periphery of the Party's work one observes this special relationship, 
when, due to lack of materials, the Bible is used practically as the 
only "textbook". in the schooling of members. This was also shown at the 
end of 1945 in the combined efforts to see religious education .accepted 
as a school subject on the same level of respect as all other subjects. 
This attempt was rejected by the other parties. Only sporadically were 
there inner..:Party conflicts concerning a perceived over-representation 
of Catholics in the CDU, giving rise to the suspicion . that the new CDU 
could simply be a successor to the old Zentrum Party, It was not until 
the. summer of 1946 , in connection with the first parliamentary 
elections·, that the ·Soviet Military Administration started to oppose the 
frequently open cooperation between church and party. Nonetheless, many 
clergy were on the candidate lists of the CDU. 
The CDU' s original central demands (political democracy, creation 
and preservation of a constitutional state, protection of private 
property, nationalization of natural resources, public control of mining 
and of key monopolistic corporations) were so vaguely expressed that 
there was great room for the most varied interpretations. The CDU 
organization also showed · numerous weaknesses. There was no central 
steering body, but rather an indeterminate number of . the <?riginal · 
"Founders' coinmittee" of Berlin. 
The ability of the CDU to take and defend a political positio� was 
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tested in the late summer of 1945. The Founders' Committee spoke out for 
a redistribution of agricultural land, but their unwillingness to accept 
expropriation without compensation caused the Soviet Military Authori­
ties to dismiss Hermes and Schreider (whom they had already distrusted 
due to their stubborn defense of political views). Jakob Kaiser and 
Ernst Lemmer, two remaining top functionaries, took over the open posts. 
Under the new leadership the party began to become less a tradi­
tional middle-class party and developed a more . "socialist" profile. 
Kaiser sought to steer the party towards the goal of "Socialism with 
Christian responsibility. "  
The economic foundations of the proposed new society were : 
--- the workers would have a say on the job; 
private property would be guaranteed, except for nationaliza­
tion of the key industries; 
--- skeleton planning would be introduced by the state. 
When this program was officially accepted at the 
Conference in June, 1946 , it was clear that the goal 
First Party 
of the CDU 
leadership was 
through later 
to attract as many former SPD members as possible and, 
elections, become the strongest political party in the 
Soviet Zone. Although the concrete concept of "Christian Socialism" did 
not succeed, the above program was still what the party sought to 
formulate until approximately the middle of 1951. The membership--
200, 000 in September, 194 7--composed of people formerly not affiliated 
politically, readily accepted this clear change in program. 
Despite all attempts, however, the CDU was not able to fulfill its 
goal of becoming an equal rival to the SED in the Fall elections of 
1946. The CDU received 20% of the vote. It was ·able to surpass the SED 
in industrialized areas and in conjunction with the Liberal Democratic 
party. In two of five provincial diets the CDU and LDP held the majority 
of votes. These results, together with results of the sister party in 
West Germany, justified the claim of being the "strongest political 
power" in post-war Germany. 
If one tries to summarize the CDU's political position in 
1946-1947, it is clear that, despite its socialistic program, the CDU 
primarily worked for the protection of the economic interests of the 
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middle class and the realization of church interests. Specific interests 
of the workers were hardly considered. 
The deepening division between the eastern and western parts of 
Germany , caused by the controversies among the four powers in the second 
half of 1947 , made it more and more difficult to be in opposition 
politically to the Soviets. 
The final break between the CDU and the S9viets came closer when , 
in mid-1947 , .  Kaiser sharply rejected the ever clearer claim to 
leadership by the SED. The reprisals demanded at a meeting of the CDU 
party heads climaxed in the statement that in .the future the CDU should 
function as a "breakwater of dogmatic Marxism" in the Soviet Zone. 
Kaiser was still completely supported by the membership. In a 
secret ballot .he was re-elected chairman with only one vote against and 
one abstention. Even many· of the delegates who later distanced 
themselves from him still supported his political stance. Nonetheless , 
he was in a weakened position because of the changing political 
situation and the fact that he had notr been able to keep the 
organization of a United German CDU alive. Adenauer kept his distance , 
suspecting that Kaiser was being influenced by the Soviets. Adenauer 
failed .to come to the GDR-CDU party conference in Berlin. Kaiser's 
attempts at establishing a "National Representation" failed due to the 
riegati ve attitude of the West German SPD and CDU. Hence , through no 
fault of its own� the CDU found itself isolated. 
The final break came when the entire CDU refused to support an SED 
appeal" for a "Peoples; Congress on Unity and Just Peace , "  because the 
cooperation of the Western German parties could not be expected. This 
negative attitude gave the Soviet Military Authority the occasion to 
remove the CDU leadership from their offices. 
Soon afterwards Otto Nuschke , who was 
became the CDU chairman. On December ll , 
Kaiser's resignation. 
acceptable to the Soviets, 
1947 , he openly demanded 
When Nuschke became the new CDU chairman at the Third Party 
Conference in September , 1948--a position he held till his death in 
1957--the role which the SED and SMA planned for the CDU had changed 
gravely. The transformation of the CDU was a direct result of the 
- 4 -
transformation of the SED , which now claimed the lone leadership role in 
government and society. At the provincial level , the CDU became a very 
different party by the fall of 1952. 
It . was apparently not Nuschke's original intention to work toward 
such a change . .  He tried to maintain the independence of the party , and 
attempted to keep united German contacts and cooperation. He even 
renewed Kaiser's statement of "Christian Socialism. " The Union still 
worked toward these goals which were clearly anti-Marxist , again.st the 
SED. 
The CDU' s followers evidently honored this attempt at continuity 
for , despite withdrawals , the party was successful in increasing 
membership to its highest level--21 3 , 000--in September , 1948. However , 
within the framework of the official "Construction of Socialism" 
(officially accepted in 1952) , the CDU as a party of opposition 
possessed ever narrowing elbowroom. Nuschke recognized the necessity of 
showing willingness toward reaching an understanding with the SED. This 
decision to seek agreement included a commitment to accommodation in 
times of conflict. This was the Party's political situation in the 
following years. 
The CDU leadership decided to promote its own viewpoints in regard 
to the key political issues , such as the postponement of elections in 
1948 and 1949 , the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border� the 
establishment of the GDR and the setting up of unified· election lists. 
Nevertheless , . the CDU was forced to tie itself to the SED line as soon 
as any of these problems took on a political or existential character. 
It was forced to accept the SED position to ensure the preservation of 
the party. Hence , the policy of the CDU was clear and predictable for 
the SED. 
When it watered down its own positions , at the same time 
approaching the view of the SED , the CDU robbed itself of its political 
credibility. The assimilation by the Leninists of the party of 
leadership also affected the area of organization , for the principle of 
democratic centralism encouraged the members to increasingly take over 
control from the leaders. 
By the end of 1948 many members had left; ten years later the 
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lowest ·membership ever.,--1001000--was registered. Between 1948 and 1952 
the leadership changed greatly. Of the· original Founders' Committee only 
Nuschke and Fobedanz were left in leading positions by mid-1950. ·Young 1 
inexperienced members took the places .of those who .were in politics· 
sine� tl)e Weimar Republic. This basic change in structure was prill!.arily . 
a result of a purg� by .the SED 1 which actually made decisions regarding 
personnel. Even slight deviations in behavior raised .the suspicions of 
the SED and were dealt with either directly or indirectly. 
The CDU was able to keep its integrity the longest in the area of 
program .  "Christian Socialism" was not replaced by "Christian Realism" 
until the second half of 1951. It was difficult when forming a position 
paper in October 1 19511 to convincingly combine ·christianity with the 
development of -a social system of the Soviet type. The final point in 
the position paper read: 
Through Christian responsibility the. CDU ·. 
professes itself for the socialist order of 
society. Socialism gives Christians the best 
possibility of realizing the teachings of .christ 
and of practicing practical Christianity. Marx's 
teaching cif the establishment of a new 1 better 
societal order has been realized in exemplary 
form in. socialist Soviet Union. The Christian 
democrats recog·nize that the working class has 
, . the leadership on .the. way to establishing 
socialism and is firmly determined 1 together 
with the party of the working class 1 to fight 
for the realization of these goals. 
· 
.To solve this problem at least formally was the prerequisite for 
the acceptance of the role which the SED designated to the CDU. The goal 
of the SED-inspired transformation of the CDU was for it to become a 
controll�d mass organization led by the Leninist party 1.:· which received 
tasks for the building of socialism. In the case of tne CDU the task 
c.onsisted of following a policy of alliance to integrate into the 
socialist society the Christian citizens and their religious communi­
.ties. The Sixth Party Conference in October 1 19521 spoke to this new 
function through corresponding resolutions. 
:The CDU carries important responsibility 
towards the establishment of socialism in the 
GDR. It has the task to tirelessly educate the 
Christian population about the socialist order 
to gather the peaceloving Christians and to lead 
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them in participating toward socialist goals. 
Hence the CDU is the leading and helping power 
of the Christian population in the GDR. 
The fact that the CDU clearly took the side of the state in its 
church policies alienated many members, who turned their backs on the 
Party and, when it came to real conflicts, stood on the side of the 
church. Many feared the CDU would drive a wedge between· the church 
leadership and the church members. After all, a member of the Political 
Committee of the CDU and GDR Foreign Minister Dertinger openly demanded 
in 1952: "If we do not succeed in leading the church to the state, then 
we shall have to lead the Christians to the state against the will of 
the churches. " 
Here was an example, as was soon to be. evident, of a gross miscal­
culation of its own abilities. On the contrary, it had not yet succeeded 
in convincing its own members of the correctness of CDU politics over 
against the churches. The majority of the membership rejected the 
unmodified acceptance of the goals of the SED and chose the .side of the 
churches in the great conflicts of the time. 
This alienation between party leadership and members was the 
primary cause of the decrease in membership. The influence of the 
churches upon the CDU thus became, ironically, greater than that of the 
CDU upon the churches. 
Only gradually did the realization come that the cnurches would be 
able to survive even in socialism. The churches' members numbered in the 
millions and therefore represented one of the greatest mass organiza­
tions. The influence of the CDU in the churches could only be achieved 
by active participation and full integration in the work of the church 
by as large a number of party members as possible. 
Translated from German by 
Norman Robinson 
Westtown School 
Westtown, Pennsylvania 
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